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Perspectives on Missouri v . Jenkins: 
Abandoning the Unfinished Business of 
Public School Desegregation "With 
All Deliberate Speed" 
JOSE FELIPE ANDERSON* 
[T]he problem seems to me to be one of realiy scrutinizing the goals 
of American education. 
Education is all a matter of building bridges, it seems to me. 
Environment is bouncing everything off everybody in this country. 
- Ralph Ellison 1 
Integration and education are not synonymous, though Americans 
appear to think so. 
- James Baldwin2 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; J.D. 1984, Univer-
sity of Maryland School of Law; B.A. 1981, University of Maryland, Baltimore County. I would 
like to thank Betsy Levin, Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law at the University of Balti-
more, 1995-1996, for her input and insight on this effort. Her expertise and direction, acquired 
from years of scholarship, teaching, and public service, including her service as counsel to the 
United States Department of Education, encouraged me to offer my thoughts on this important 
issue. Any merit is due to her influence and inspiration; any shortcomings are mine alone. I 
would also like to thank my wife, Dreama Clarke Anderson, my mother Aquilla Alaba Rice, and 
my aunt, Dorothy C. Thomas, all educators who provided me a realistic perspective on the 
changes that have occurred in public education since I attended grade school. 
I dedicate this essay to the memory of my grandmother, Dorothy Wynn Alaba, whose life-
long commitment to public education inspired four generations; and to my great uncle, William 
I. Gosnell, who, as co-counsel with Charles Hamilton Houston and Thurgood Marshall, repre-
sented Donald Gaines Murray in the early 1930s and desegregated the University of Maryland 
School of Law. 
1. RALPH ELUSON, GOING TO THE TERRITORY 66 (1986) (address given at a seminar on 
"Education for Culturally Different Youth" in Dedham, Massachusetts, 1963). 
2. JAMES BALDWIN, No NAME IN THE STREET 59 (1972). 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This essay examines the continuing struggle that centers around 
whether this country will allow public elementary and secondary 
school officials to use race-conscious, and sometimes aggressive, tools 
to eliminate the continuing presence of predominantly single race 
schools in most of our urban centers. Despite the promise of Brown v. 
Board of Education,3 the efforts to desegregate schools in some areas 
of America appear to have eliminated only the legal barriers to truly 
integrated schools. Many school systems have simply resegregated 
through demographic shifts prompted by urban decay and "white 
ftight."4 In Missouri v. Jenkins,S the Supreme Court struck down cer-
tain district court-ordered remedies designed to attract non-minority 
students to the Kansas City, Missouri School District ("KCMSD"). In 
this decision, a sharply divided Court once again confronted the prob-
lem of what local school districts can be compelled to do to eliminate 
the problem of past discrimination.6 By weakening the power of the 
federal courts to order aggressive remedies, the Supreme Court has 
clearly indicated that it intends to abandon its commitment to deseg-
regating public schools, seemingly joining the political opposition to 
3. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown 1). In Brown, the 
Supreme Court concluded that "separate but equal" had no place in the field of public education 
because separate schools "with the sanction of law ... harvel a tendency to [retard] the educa-
tional and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits 
they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system." Id. at 494-95. 
4. See generally Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451. 466 (\972) 
(prohibiting city from withdrawing from an existing county school district when the entire school 
system was under federal order to desegregate. The Court held that the potential for white flight 
from the county school system "would actually impede the process of dismantling the existing 
dual system"). 
The problem of "white flight" has made exceedingly difficult local efforts to achieve schools 
with a more balanced racial makeup. Professor Stephen L. Carter has cogently explained the 
phenomenon in this way: 
Ima~ne a spectrum of white students, each with a slightly different tolerance for inte-
gratIOn. As the first black students arrive in a formerly segregated school, the white 
students with the smallest tolerance for integration leave the school. This increases the 
proportion of black students, which means that the white students with the next smalI-
est tolerance for integration leave .. " This goes on until the only white students left 
are those who either cannot leave or possess an infinite tolerance for integration-not 
likely a substantial number. 
STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLEcnONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE AcnON BABY 234 (1991). 
5. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995) [hereinafter Jenkins III]. 
6. Comparable educational funding for blacks is not a new problem. Historically, state 
government could not even be trusted to distribute federal educational funds fairly. Experience 
with some state distribution of funds has shown that when such funds were distributed to black 
schools during legally mandated segregation, "frequently either the funds for Negro schools 
were diverted in part to white schools or the local support of Negro schools [was] reduced." See 
GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOC-
RACY 1271 n.21 (1944). 
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busing, magnet school programs, and other educational reforms that 
have already compromised the promise that schools should be deseg-
regated with "all deliberate speed.,,7 The real tragedy of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Jenkins is that it is likely to have a chilling effect on 
school officials trying to achieve desegregation, and federal judges and 
litigants attempting to draft plans that are designed to facilitate that 
goal. 
The struggles encountered in achieving legal recognition of the 
impropriety of de jure segregation suggest that the high cost that has 
already been paid by so many should encourage our nation to con-
tinue to push aggressively toward the goal of integration. My view is 
that we must pursue integration even while acknowledging recent fail-
ures that have led some to call for the abandonment of techniques 
designed to integrate public schools.8 It is my hope that those deci-
sion makers who are attempting to continue efforts to desegregate will 
not be discouraged by the Supreme Court's most recent reduction of 
the power of the federal courts to advance efforts to achieve desegre-
gated education. This nation should press forward with good faith ef-
forts to integrate the public schools despite the challenges that might 
lead some educational policy makers to abandon that goal. Failure to 
do so will result in the erosion of public education for all. Such a 
consequence we can hardly afford. 
Before I offer my thoughts on integration and the Supreme 
Court's decision in Jenkins, it seems appropriate that I should disclose 
something of my background and experience. I am of African-Ameri-
can and Filipino heritage and am the product of the integrated schools 
of a majority white public school district. I would characterize my 
public educational experience as good, but certainly not perfect. My 
elementary and secondary education occurred while the schools I at-
tended were trying to adjust to the challenges of desegregation. I en-
7. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) [hereinafter Brown 11). 
8. One critic of Brown observed that "[i]n basing the Brown doctrine in a sweeping deci-
sion purely within the purpose and function of public school education, the courts committed a 
beneficial act analogous to freeing long-tenn convicts from prison without adequate resources to 
survive in the free world." HAROLD CRUSE, PLURAL BUT EQUAL 67-68 (1987). Another skeptic 
of Brown commented that he was troubled by any suggestion that the problem of addressing 
"the damaging effects of segregation ... can be corrected by the simple expedient of appropri-
ately mixing Black and White bodies." Michael A. Middleton, Brown v. Board: Revisited, 20 S. 
ILL. U. LJ. 19,21 (1995). Professor Middleton further remarked that the pursuit of integration 
with "myopic zeal, may hamper the development of potentially effective remedies for the linger-
ing effects of segregation." Id. The observations of Middleton and Cruse are valid to a point; 
however, I maintain that any failure of integration is more attributable to the blatant resistance 
to its implementation than to any structural failure of the Brown opinion. 
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countered some parents, teachers, and students who were 
uncomfortable with the mixed-race classroom, but there were also 
many people of good faith who worked toward making an unfamiliar 
setting comfortable for all. Consequently, my integrated education 
was more beneficial than it was harmful. My experience cannot, of 
course, stand alone as reason to endorse aggressive plans to integrate 
public school systems; but my experience does tell me that to abandon 
all such efforts would be premature. It is with such a view and, if you 
will, with such a bias that I approach the concept of integration and 
challenge the Supreme Court's opinion in Jenkins. . 
II. INTEGRATING PUBLIC SCHOOLS: HISTORICAL 
ORIGINS AND PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS 
The current, poor state of public education for minorities gener-
ally in this country cannot be divorced from our nation's shameful 
history of providing unequal educational opportunity to African 
Americans after the Civil War and up to the early 1950s.9 We cer-
tainly can begin with the tragedy of the institution of slavery and its 
painful legacy in our country. The decision to enact slave codes de-
claring reading and writing to be illegal for bla.cks affected the genera-
tions that followed. lO More than almost any other institution, 
education is built on tradition. If one's tradition of education begins 
with the fear that learning may provoke physical harm and severe 
punishment, one's motivation for establishing a tradition of learning 
WOUld, of course, be seriously impaired.11 Some African Americans-
9. After the Civil War, the Freedman's Bureau was established to "compensate" for years 
of legally enforced ignorance at a rate of about $1.25 per person. The Bureau did manage to 
operate about 4,000 small schools across the South. serving approximately 250,000 people of all 
ages who were attempting to acquire some education after generations of bitter bondage. By 
1870, however, the Bureau was dismantled and its efforts to aid freed slaves were mostly aban-
doned. See RICHARD KLUGER. SIMPLE JUSTICE 50 (1976). 
10. For example, Georgia's slave code, enacted in 1860 during the South's secession, pro-
vided that any free person could be punished for "supplying books to a slave." DON E. 
FEHRENBACHER. THE DRED SCOTr CASE: ITs SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLmcs 
30-31 (1978). 
11. ld. Noted historian Lawrence Friedman writes: 
During the high noon of slavery, the slave codes were important documents. They va-
ried in their aetails, from Florida to Arkansas to Texas; but the general outlines were, 
depressingly, much the same .... [T]he law codified and expressed the basic theorem 
of slave law(,] ... the right [of the slave master] to administer summary punishment or 
"correction. ' In plain blunt English. it was the power to beat, to hit, to flog, to whip, to 
inflict quick dry dirty punishment, on the spot and to the point. 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 85 (1993). 
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for example, the incomparable Frederick Douglass12-have overcome 
legal prohibitions against education. But education as a foundation 
for an entire culture requires great effort from all parts of the commu-
nity. It would be unfair to the average person emerging from slavery 
to equate the experience of the exceptional Mr. Douglass with his own 
access to opportunity to self educate. Indeed, for newly freed slaves, 
obtaining education was a daunting task, considering the many other 
challenges they faced simply to survive.13 
Although'there were some provisions made for educating free 
blacks in post-Civil War America, those efforts could only be de-
scribed as meager at best.14 After the Civil War, Reconstruction at-
tempted to remedy many of the ills of siavery,1S The success of those 
efforts was dubious to be sure, but for the newly freed slaves, any state 
or federally funded effort to educate a people lacking-and, indeed, 
barred from-resources to do it themselves was, no doubt, welcome. 
After Reconstruction the inspirational life stories of Booker T. Wash-
ington,16 W.E.B. Dubois17 and George Washington Carver18 served as 
12. WILLIAM S. McFEELY, FREDERICK DOUGLASS 26-39 (1991). McFeely recounts Freder-
ick Douglass's experience educating himself as a young slave living in Fells Point, Baltimore, 
Maryland, and particularly his purchase of his own copy of The Columbian Orator. McFeely 
writes that "[s]eldom has a single book more profoundly shaped the life of a writer and orator." 
ld. at 34. 
13. The mobilization of the black community after the Civil War was remarkable consider-
ing the "wave of violence that raged almost unchecked in large parts of the postwar South." 
ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINiSHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at 119 
(1988). One official of the Freedman's Bureau said that blacks were "frequently beaten unmer-
cifully, and shot down like wild beasts, without any provocation." ld. 
14. Before emancipation debate raged over the public education of free blacks in Northern 
schools, most efforts to integrate schools in Northern states and the new Western territories met 
with stem resistance. For an excellent review of the efforts to educate free blacks prior to the 
Civil War, and the issues that complicated those efforts, see LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAV-
ERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES 1790-1860, at 113-52 (1961). After the Civil War, efforts 
to provide education in the South were affected by national attitudes and resistance against 
providing education to blacks and the political actions those attitudes stimulated. When the 
North abandoned reconstruction reforms, the South's "educational system ... was crippled by 
insufficient appropriations." McFEELY, supra note 12, at 299 (citation omitted). 
15. "Perhaps the most striking illustration of the freedmen's quest for self-improvement 
was their seemingly unquenchable thirst for education." See FONER, supra note 13, at 96; see also 
id. at 98 (detailing blacks' extensive efforts after the Civil War, despite continuing impoverish-
ment, to establish public education). 
16. See BOOKER T. WASHINGTON, UP FROM SLAVERY: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1907) 
(describing the self-education of Washington's youth until his founding of Tuskegee Institute). 
In his noted autObiography, Washington wrote, "I determined, when I was a small child, that, if I 
accomplished nothing else in life, I would in some way get enough education to enable me to 
read common books and newspapers." [d. at 27. After moving to a West Virginia cabin, his 
mother obtained a copy of a Webster "blue-back" spelling book that was to become his first tool 
of learning. Jd. In recalling his early educational experience, he wrote, "At the time there was 
not a single member of my race anywhere near us who could read, and I was too timid to ap-
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an inspiration to many of their race, and at a minimum dispelled the 
myth of black inferiority19 or any notion that blacks were either un-
willing or unable to learn. 
proach any of the white people. In some way within a few weeks, I mastered the greater portion 
of the alphabet." Id. at 27·28. 
17. See DAVID L. LEWIS, W.E.B. DUBOIS, BIOGRAPHY OF A RACE 1868-1919 (1993) 
(describing the educational backgrounds and experiences, during Reconstruction through the 
early twentieth century, of the renowned civil rights leader and first African American to win a 
Doctorate from Harvard University). Dubois was born during the peak of Reconstruction in 
1868. At that time, the educational resources for the newly freed slaves were limited. Dr. Lewis 
described the Fisk Free Colored School that opened in early 1866 on the site of a Union Army 
hospital near Nashville, Tennessee as "narrow, windowless frame buildings jammed into a small 
rectangle near Chattanooga depot." Id. at 56. Illustrating the demand for education, Dr. Lewis 
wrote "Two hundred ex-slaves, men, women, and children, came to learn to read, write, and 
count on the first day. By February, six hundred clamored for instruction. A year later, a thou-
sand a day were being spelled .... " [d. at 56-57. Examples such as these leave little doubt that 
African Americans anxiously embraced educational opportunity as soon as legal barriers to 
those opportunities were removed. 
18. See RACKHAM HOLT, GEORGE WASHINGTON CARVER: AN AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 
(1943) (examining the life and education ofthe modest and diligent scientist). The Holt biogra-
phy describes Carver's Reconstruction days in Missouri and the small one-room schoolhouse 
established by the Freedman's Bureau where he received his first training. Holt describes the 
challenge for the school's first Negro teacher: 
In the one room of the Lincoln School, a tumbledown cabin fourteen feet by sixteen, he 
did the best he could with his own limited education for the seventy-five children 
massed on the high, hard benches before him. 
Into this throng George [Washington Carver] was promptly insened .... He was an 
absorptive sponge whose thirst for more knowledge was increased with the salt of 
fervor. 
Id. at 26. 
19. At the tum of the twentieth century, the myth of black inferiority was not only sup· 
ported by demeaning stereotypes but also by questionable research. For example. one biologist, 
Charles B. Davenport, claimed that heredity, not environment, accounted for the superiority of 
whites over blacks; and Yale's William Graham Sumner argued that changing the law would not 
change the circumstance of a man "born of an inferior race." See HARVARD SITKOFF, A NEW 
DEAL FOR BLACKS: THE EMERGENCE OF CIVIL RIGHTS AS A NATIONAL ISSUE: THE DEPRES· 
SION DECADE 5-6 (1978). Such notions even lingered into post-Brown era litigation. See Brun· 
son v. Board of Trustees, 429 F.2d 820, 824 (4th Cir. 1970) (criticizing the dissent's endorsement 
of the educational theory that seeks to establish schools with a predominantly middle class stu-
dent body-where "middle class" is synonymous with "white" and the subordinate "lower class" 
is synonymous with "black"-as a pretext for achieving majority white schools). The central 
proposition of expert testimony heard in Brunson was the curious notion that '''there does seem 
to be some optimum level for the achievement of both white and black children that drops after 
35 or 40 (percent of black students in the school is surpassed).'" [d. at 821 (quoting expert 
testimony). In rejecting this thesis, Judge Sobeloff, in his concurring opinion, recognized that "at 
bottom [such theories] rest[] on the generalization that educationally speaking, white pupils are 
better and somehow more desirable than black pupils. This premise leads to the next proposi-
tion, that association with white pupils helps the blacks so long as whites predominate .... But 
once the number of whites approaches minority, then association with inferior black children 
hurts the whites and, because there are not enough good whites to go around, does not apprecia-
bly help the blacks." Id. at 826. Judge Sobeloff cogently observed that "this theory grossly mis-
apprehends the philosophical basis for desegregation." [d. 
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Predictably, the great changes in the country after the Civil War 
and Reconstruction led to Plessy v. Ferguson20 and several decades of 
legally mandated segregation. Although Plessy dealt with public ac-
commodations on railroads, one of the most conspicuous casualties of 
Plessy's separate-but-equal doctrine was educational resources for 
children.21 For several decades the nightmare of inequality in a "sepa-
rate but equal" world became all too apparent. African Americans 
had neither the political ability nor the financial resources to change 
their circumstances?2 
New hope came in the form of a band of lawyers intent on using 
the courts to help their people out of the quandary of separate but 
equal. In the early 1930s, Charles Hamilton Houston, Thurgood Mar-
shall, Houston's star pupil, and others joined in the fight for equality. 
They selected from many worthy cases only a few that demonstrated 
the greatest promise to advance the goal of desegregating public edu-
cation?3 One early case, widely recognized as Marshall's earliest civil 
rights victory, was Pearson v. Murray,24 which successfully desegre-
gated the University of Maryland's law school in Baltimore, Mar-
shall's hometown.25 Other major victories in desegregating graduate 
20. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In Plessy, the Supreme Court considered an 
1890 Louisiana law that required rail passengers of different races to ride in separate rail cars. 
Plessy sat in a rail car reserved for whites. He was asked to leave and was arrested after he 
refused to do so. [d. at 538. Plessy argued that he "was seven-eighths Caucasian, one-eighth 
African blood ... and that he was entitled to every right [of] the white race." [d. Under Plessy, 
"Congress and the states could not prohibit racial segregation, but the states could compel it" 
LEONARD W. LEVY, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT 34 (1967). Thus, Plessy and 
the statutes and cases it spawned "most certainly dammed up and discouraged the democratic 
values of American life, stunted the political and moral capacity of people, and released and 
energized the most unworthy, even bigoted forces." [d. 
21. "In 1915, South Carolina spent $23.76 on the average white child in public school, [but 
only] $2.91 on the average Negro child. As late as 1931 six southeastern states (Alabama, Ar-
kansas, Florida, Georgia, North and South Carolina) spent less than a third as much per Negro 
public school pupil as per white child." ANTHONY LEWIS, PORTRAIT OF A DECADE: THE SEC-
OND AMERICAN REVOLUTION 20 (1964). "[T]he annual salary for the Negro public school 
teacher in the 17 states with compulsory segregation laws was $601 in 1940. The corresponding 
figure for white teachers was $1,046." ARNOLD ROSE, THE NEGRO IN AMERICA 117 (1948). 
22. See ROSE, supra note 21, at 117-18 (describing Southern white-controlled schOOl author-
ities' strategies for underfunding black schools and black teachers' colleges to maintain white 
dominance). 
23. For an outstanding survey of the litigation that led up to Brown v. Board of Education, 
see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976). 
24. Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590 (Md. 1936). 
25. [d. at 593-94. Charles Houston was cautious about becoming involved in the desegrega-
tion of the University of Maryland law school, wanting to ensure that the case would fit into his 
plan to attack the as applied constitutionality of the separate-but-equal doctrine. See KLUGER, 
supra note 23, at 186. A Baltimore attorney, Bedford V. Lawson, Jr., who was planning to bring 
suit against the entire University of Maryland system, and another Baltimore attorney, William 
Gosnell, brought Donald Gaines Murray to the attention of Marshall and Houston as a possible 
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and professional education followed.26 During that period, segrega-
tion in many other areas was challenged, but, ultimately, the true goal 
crystallized-to achieve equal educational opportunity.27 Making ed-
ucation a priority reflected the reality that only through education 
could the entire African-American culture make significant strides to 
become a vital part of America,zs The strategy of Houston, Marshall, 
and the other lawyers at the NAACP Legal Defense Fund29 
plaintiff. [d. at 186-87. Murray was a well-qualified graduate of Amherst College and a member 
of a prominent Baltimore family affiliated with the African Methodist Episcopal Church. With a 
suitable plaintiff available, Houston pursued the case against the law school, believing it unwise 
to challenge the entire University. [d. at 187. Marshall, legal counsel to the Baltimore branch of 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP"), was particularly 
anxious to obtain a victory against the University and to put the branch on the map as a civil 
rights force in the black community. [d. at 184-86. 
Before Marshall and Houston became Murray's attorneys, Gosnell had advised Murray to 
write to Raymond A. Pearson, the president of the University, to inquire about admission to law 
school. When Murray infonned Pearson he was a Negro, the president recommended that the 
Amherst graduate attend either Morgan College or Princess Anne Academy-a demeaning sug-
gestion, considering that neither institution had a law school. Id. at 188. Led by Houston, the 
team of lawyers was successful at both the trial and appellate court levels, and the State of 
Maryland did not seek review of the case by the United States Supreme Court. [d. at 192-94. 
26. See, e.g., Missouri ex rei. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (holding that the refusal 
to admit a black student to the all-white University of Missouri law school, when no other equal 
facility for blacks existed in the state, violated equal protection). That Missouri was willing to 
pay for Gaines to attend an out-of-state school was inadequate to cure the constitutional viola-
tion. /d. at 349-50. 
27. The NAACP became involved in many legal disputes regarding equal treatment. One 
of its more noteworthy activities was its effort to desegregate the military. For an interesting 
account of that endeavor, see MICHAEL D. DAVIS & HUNTER R. CLARK, THURGOOD MAR-
SHALL: WARRIOR AT THE BAR, REBEL ON THE BENCH 120-32 (1992). 
Discrimination in the anned forces was a matter of grave concern during World War II. "By 
1940, there were less than 5,000 Blacks in the American anny composed of 230,000 enlisted men 
and officers. At the beginning of the war emergency, there were less than a dozen Black officers 
in the regular anny." ACKLYN LYNCH, NIGHTMARE OVERHANGING DARKLY 58 (1992) (footnote 
omitted). When blacks enlisted, they were sent to mostly segregated units and assigned almost 
exclusively to jobs as servants and laborers. "Thurgood Marshall dispatched a letter ... to 
Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, listing the services that excluded Blacks. He warned that 
when conscription was enacted, Blacks who were refused the right to serve in all branches of the 
service would prefer to go to jail." [d. (footnote omitted). 
28. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., has commented that "Brown changed the moral tone of 
America; by eliminating the legitimization of state imposed racism it implicitly questioned ra-
cism wherever it was used." A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., An Open Letter /0 Justice Clarence 
Thomas from a Federal Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1005, 1017-18 (1992). 
29. See generally JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURT. How A DEDICATED 
BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CiVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 85-191 (1994) (describing the 
events, beginning with the decision to attack the constitutionality of Jim Crow, leading to the 
Brown decision). The struggle to desegregate sometimes brought about violence. Greenberg, 
an NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund lawyer, recounts that in 1958, "John Kasper, a 
notorious segregationist, led riots to attack first-grade desegregation. A bomb destroyed a syna-
gogue. Hattie Cotton School, where one black child was enrolled, was bombed." Id. at 254. 
Local resistence to desegregation was often violent. 
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culminated in the original Brown decision, intended to implement de-
segregation in public elementary and secondary schools. 3D 
The question of implementing Brown was to be settled in Brown 
11.31 The Supreme Court, in discussing the remedial power of the 
lower courts to enforce the Court's desegregation mandate, instructed 
that 
[T]he courts will be guided by equitable principles. . .. Courts of 
equity may properly take into account the public interest in the 
elimination of such obstacles in a systematic and effective manner. 
But it should go without saying that the vitality of these constitu-
tional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disa-
greement with them.32 
30. The problem of judicial remedy has plagued the implementation of Brown from the 
beginning. In the oral argument of the cases intended to fashion a remedy for the violations 
identified by the Supreme Court in the first Brown decision, Justice Reed queried that "[i]f there 
were more time [for states to desegregate] ... there would be opportunity for the enactment of 
state law that would put into a central body authority to carry forward desegregation?" Tran-
script of Proceedings, Harry Briggs, Jr. v. W. Elliot, at 134 (transcript of Justice Marshall's argu-
ment before the Supreme Court in Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955» (on file with Howard 
University School of Law Library). Thurgood Marshall, arguing the case on behalf of the black 
school children, was worried about the prospect of allowing further delay because of the enforce-
ment problems. He argued: 
The effect [of delay] would be to say to all the district courts of the states, [that] the 
several states could decide in their own minds as to how much time was necessary-
then the Negro in this country would be in a horrible shape .... He, as a matter of fact, 
would be as bad, if not worse off than under separate but equal doctrine for this reason. 
When they produce reasons for delay, they are up in the air, they are pretty hard to pin 
down. 
And, as a lawyer, it is difficult to meet that type of presentation. In separate but 
equal, we could count the number of books, the number of bricks, the number of teach-
ers and find out whether the school was physically equal or not. But now, enforcement 
of this will be left to the judgment of the District Court with practically no safeguards. 
[d. at 140. 
31. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 294. It has been said that "Brown v. Board of Education [was] one 
of the most daring assertions of court authority in judicial history." ROBERT G. McCLOSKEY, 
THE MODERN SUPREME COURT 333 (1973). 
Some critics have argued that while "Brown was a great and correct decision ... it must be 
said in all candor that the decision was supported by a very weak opinion." ROBERT H. BORK, 
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 75 (1990). The legal basis of the opinion, which relied on social 
science information, called the opinion into question soon after it was issued. See Herbert 
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. I, 31-35 (1959) 
(suggesting that Brown did not rest on any neutral principle of constitutional adjudication). 
32. Brown II, 349 U.S, at 300. One chronicle of the Brown decision observed that "[t]he 
Supreme Court's refusal to set deadlines for desegregation invited Southern officials to invent 
foot dragging tactics. . . . [T]he court's faint-hearted approach was matched by the other 
branches of the federal government." PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICOONS 110 
(1988). The Court's approach presented special problems for those families attempting to inte-
grate schools in the newly desegregated Southern states. 
Those few southern blacks who dared seek their newly affirmed rights faced the 
threat of harsh reprisal. Black parents who petitioned'their local school board to com-
ply with the Brown ruling often discovered their name listed prominently in local news-
papers-to be read by white employers and landlords upon whom they were 
dependent. 
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Following Brown II, a twenty-year struggle to implement desegrega-
tion ensued, primarily in the South, involving instances of "admitted 
sta te-imposed segregation. "33 
This resistance to Brown in many states, and the still-perplexing 
question of remedy, dimmed the hope that both the letter and the 
spirit of Brown would be realized. Litigation over various state efforts 
to avoid segregation followed Brown II, including plans that permitted 
students to transfer to a school where they would be in the majority.34 
For example, Prince Edward County, Virginia, suspended public fund-
ing of any school attended by both blacks and whites and paid tuition 
grants to white students who chose to attend non-sectarian private 
schools, creating a situation where African Americans were effectively 
denied education from 1959-1963.35 In another case, the Supreme 
Court invalidated plans that sought to desegregate schools at a pace of 
"one year, one grade" for being too slow.36 In 1968, in Green v. New 
Kent County School Board,37 the Supreme Court invalidated a free-
dom-of-choice plan that allowed pupils to choose which public schools 
SETH CAGIN & PHILIP DRAY, WE ARE NOT AFRAID 54 (1988). 
33. For an excellent, detailed discussion of the litigation that occurred between Brown 1I 
and Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) [hereinafter Milliken 1], see Betsy Levin & Philip 
Moise, School Desegregation Litigation in the Seventies and the Use of Social Science Evidence: 
An Annotated Guide, 39 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 50. 57-114 (1975). 
34. Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963). In Goss, the Supreme Court struck down a 
transfer plan because of its unilateral effect on the composition of the schools. As the court 
explained, "[T]he right to transfer, which operates solely on the basis of racial classification is a 
one-way ticket leading to but one destination. i.e., the majority race of the transferee and contin-
ued segregation." [d. at 687. 
35. In Griffin v. School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964), the Supreme 
Court invalidated this practice. 
Virginia was not alone in its resistance to desegregation by attempting to destroy the local 
public school system. Another example was Macon County, Alabama, where in 1963, Governor 
George Wallace solicited state employees for financial assistance to begin a private school called 
the "Macon Academy." The Governor "encouraged white residents to boycott the public 
schools in Macon County and send their children to the newly formed, private. all-white" acad-
emy. FRED GREY, Bus RIDE TO JUSTICE 212 (1995). 
Some blacks faced the special challenge of being in the first generation of students to attend 
integrated schools after Brown. In his best-selling memoir, Nathan McCall recounts his experi-
ence in Virginia in 1966 at a predominantly white junior high school, which he attended instead 
of attending the school in his mostly black community. He writes, "The U.S. Supreme Court had 
long before ruled against the notion of separate but equal schools; still, Virginia, one of the states 
that had resisted desegregation, was slow in putting together a busing plan .... [Ljike many 
blacks then, my parents figured I could get a better education at the white school across town." 
NATHAN MCCAlL, MAKES ME WANNA HOLLER 18 (1994). Difficulty adjusting to the majority 
white school and white students' refusal to accept McCall led to his suspension from that school, 
and to his parents' eventual decision to transfer him to his neighborhood school. [d. at 18-20. 
36. See Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198 (1965). 
37. Green v. New Kent County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
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they would attend.38 During that period, the Court had, in several 
cases, compelled immediate desegregation without further delay,39 an-
nounced that desegregation would be eliminated "root and branch,"40 
and approved busing under certain circumstances.41 
Although the Court noted that there is no constitutional right to 
racial balance in and of itself,42 mathematical ratios demonstrating ra-
cial imbalance could serve as a starting point.43 By the early 1970s, 
the Supreme Court had made it clear that remedies fashioned by the 
district court "may be administratively awkward, inconvenient, and 
even bizarre in some situations."44 But by 1974, the Supreme Court 
had announced its decision in Milliken v. Bradley,45 where it held that 
federal remedial powers stop at the school district line, unless the 
nearby district or the state had contributed to the constitutional viola-
tion. The decision effectively brought to an end two decades of suc-
cessful desegregation litigation in the court.46 In Milliken, Chief 
Justice Burger held that the district court exceeded its authority when 
38. Id. at 439-42. 
39. See Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.s. 19,20 (1969). 
40. Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38. In a unanimous opinion, the Court struck down a Kent 
County, Virginia plan because it was not effective in desegregating the public schools. The so-
called "freedom of choice" plan resulted in substantial continued segregation. Justice Brennan 
wrote that 
Brown 1/ was a call for the dismantling of well-entrenched dual [school] systems .... 
School boards ... then operating state-compelled dual systems were ... clearly charged 
with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a 
unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch. 
Id. The district was ordered to "fashion steps which promise realistically to convert promptly to 
a system without a 'white' school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools." Id. at 442. 
41. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,30-31 (1971). At the time of 
Swann, the Nixon Administration was faced with the challenges of implementing desegregation. 
One member of President Nixon's staff, Patrick Buchanan, wrote a memo in January 1970 "sug-
gesting that [President Nixon] was being unfair to the South by desegregating the schools there 
and not in the North." NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND 210 (1991). President Nixon 
wrote in the margin of that memo, "[W]hy should we continue to kick the South and hypocriti-
cally ignore the same problem in the North?," id., and reportedly remarked that "integration 
hasn't worked." Id. It is clear, however, that integration was a problem, not only for the South, 
but for the North as well. 
42. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 24 (holding that the constitutional mandate to desegregate does 
not mean that the racial composition of every school must reflect that of the entire school 
system): 
43. /d. at 25. 
44. Id. at 28. Among the more controversial remedies was busing. One commentator ex-
plains that "busing is seen [by the Supreme Court] as the best way to properly desegregate 
racially divided schools, albeit with some limitations. Not surprisingly, an intense debate has 
arisen among the public as to whether busing is, in fact. a proper method of integrating stu-
dents." Joel B. Teitelbaum, Comment, Issues in School Desegregation: The Dissolution of a 
Well-Intentioned Mandate. 79 MARQ. L. REV. 347,364 (1995) (footnotes omitted). 
45. Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
46. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 569 (3d ed. 1992). 
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it ordered fifty-three suburban school districts to participate in the de-
segregation plan intended to desegregate the mostly black Detroit 
school system.47 Chief Justice Burger wrote that "[i]t is obvious from 
the scope of the interdistrict remedy itself that absent a complete re-
structuring of the laws of Michigan relating to school districts, the Dis-
trict Court will become ... a de facto legislative authority ... and the 
school superintendent for the entire area."48 The Milliken decision 
foreshadowed a period of uncertainty and confusion for the remedial 
power of the federal courts and called into question the continued 
validity of Brown and its progeny. By 1986, Justice Marshall would 
remark that he was aware in 1955 that the "all deliberate speed" re-
medial formula would signal "problems ahead ... ·but I sure as hell 
never imagined we'd get to this sad state of affairs."49 
III. MISSOURI v. JENKINS III, DESEGREGATION AND THE 
AMERICAN DILEMMA AT THE CROSSROADS 
The first court order in this long-running litigation was issued in 
June 1985.50 At that time, the court identified twenty-five schools 
within the KCMSD that had enrollments of ninety percent or more 
black students51 and ordered aggressive remedies 52 in an effort to cor-
47. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 742-44. 
48. [d. at 743-44. 
49. See CARL T. ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS. DREAM BREAKERS 250 (1993). Fonner Chief 
Justice Earl Warren also voiced considerable surprise at the amount of resistance that the Brown 
decision encountered. "The Court expected some resistance from the South. But I doubt if any 
of us expected as much as we got." CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN. THE MEMOIRS OF CHIEF 
JUSTICE EARL WARREN 290 (1977). 
50. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo. 1985). For a review of the litigation 
involving the KCMSD from 1977 to 1993. see Deborah E. Beck, Note, Missouri v. Jenkins: 
School Choice As a Method for Desegregating an Inner City School District, 81 CAL. L. REV. 
1029, 1032-35 (1993). 
51. [d. at 36. 
52. See Jenkins Jll, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2042-43 (1995) (citing Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 26-33). 
The district court ordered the State of Missouri, which had been held jointly and severally liable 
for the continuing segregation in the KCMSD, to offset the cost of providing KCMSD with 
high schools in which every classroom will have air conditioning, an alarm system, and 
15 microcomputers; ... green houses and vivariums; a 25-acre farm with an air-condi-
tioned meeting room for 104 people; a Model United Nations wired for language trans-
lation; broadcast capable radio and television studios with an editing and ammation lab; 
a temperature controlled art gallery; movie editing and screening rooms; a 3,500-
square-foot dust-free diesel mechanics room; 1,875-square-[00t elementary school 
animal rooms for use in a zoo project; swimming pools; and numerous other facilities. 
Jenkins v. Missouri, 495 U.S_ 33, 77 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment). In fact, the educational plan then ordered by the court exceeded the local school 
district's budget; it was held to exceed the federal court's taxing authority. See id. at 37. 
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rect the racial disparity.53 In ordering a reduction in class size, the 
district court concluded, "Reducing class size will serve to remedy the 
vestiges of past segregation by increasing individual attention and in-
struction, as well as increasing the potential for desegregative educa-
tional experiences for KCMSD students by maintaining and attracting 
non-minority enrollment."54 In November 1986, the district court ap-
proved a plan to create magnet schools in KCMSD, as well as a capital 
improvement program, both intended to attract students from outside 
the district and from private schools. 55 Under the plan, every high 
school, middle school, and one-half of the elementary schools were 
converted into magnet schools.56 The district court concluded that 
"[t]he long-term benefit of all KCMSD students of a greater educa-
tional opportunity in an integrated environment is worthy of such an 
investment"S7 and, according to the Supreme Court, "candidly ... ac-
knowledged that it ... 'allowed the District planners to dream' and 
'provided the mechanism for those dreams to be realized.' "58 
By a slim 5-4 majority, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,59 affirming the desegregation plan of 
United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.6o 
The State of Missouri had challenged the district court's order, pri-
marily for awarding salary increases to "virtually all instructional and 
noninstructional staff within the ... [KCMSD] and ... requiring the 
State to fund remedial 'quality education' programs because student 
achievement levels were still 'at or below national norms at many 
grade levels.'. "61 
53. One commentator has described the kind of taxing power used by the federal court to 
control schools as "the greatest usurpation of legislative power and is contrary to federalism and 
state-federal comity." David G. Richardson, Returning to a General Theory of Federalism: 
Framing a New Tenth Amendment United States Supreme Court Case, 26 URB. L. 215 (1994). 




57. Id. (citing district court order). 
58. Id. (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has generally recognized that in school 
desegregation cases great deference is given the factual findings of the district court, and such 
findings should be reversed only if they are clearly erroneous. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 
U.S. 564,573 (1985). The findings of fact should thus be upheld unless the record demonstrates 
a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Id. at 573. 
59. Jenkins III, 115 S. Ct. at 2042. , 
60. Id. at 2045. The Court noted that the same district court judge had supervised the 
school districts desegregation plan since 1977. Id. at 2042. 
61. /d. The circuit court had affirmed the district court's findings that the programs and 
funding were needed, finding that 
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The State of Missouri argued that the court-ordered salary in-
creases did not directly address the state's constitutional violations. 
The Eighth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that "in addition to 
compensating the victims, the remedy ... was also designed to reverse 
white flight by offering superior educational opportunities. "62 The 
State of Missouri appealed the Eighth Circuit decision. Before ad-
dressing the merits of Missouri's specific arguments against the propri-
ety of both the salary increases and the quality education programs, 
the Court addressed the procedural question of whether the Court 
could review the scope of the remedy ordered by the district court.63 
The Court had denied certiorari on that question in prior litigation 
between the parties.64 
Chief Justice Rebnquist, writing for the majority, presumed that it 
was proper to address the question of the remedy's propriety because 
the earlier denial of certiorari imparted no expression of opinion on 
the merits of that issue.65 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Souter 
sternly criticized the majority for what he believed was an improper 
procedural approach, and that was both unfair and imprudent, be-
cause it "lulled [respondents] into addressing the case without suffi-
cient attention to the foundational issue. ,,66 
The Court, relying heavily on the scope-of-remedy analysis in 
Milliken v. Bradley,67 reversed the Eighth Circuit's affirmance of the 
remedy of salary increases and other relief ordered by the district 
court to be provided by KCMSD.68 Focusing on the district court's 
efforts to create "desegregative attractiveness,,69 to non-minority, sub-
urban students, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that a court ex-
ceeds its authority when it fashions interdistrict relief where the 
[Q]uality education programs and magnet schools were a part of the remedy for the 
vestiges of segregation causing a system wide reduction in student achievement in the 
KCMSD schools .... [W]e pointed to the district court's findings that the failure to 
remove the vestiges of the dual school system precipitated an atmosphere which pre-
vented KCMSD from raising necessary funds, specifically those to maintain reqUITed 
salary levels. 
Jenkins v. Missouri, 13 F.3d 1170, 1172 (8th Cir. 1993). 
62. Missouri v. Jenkins, 11 F.3d 755, 767 (8th Cir. 1993). 
63. Jenkins III, 115 S. Ct. at 2046-47. 
64. See id. (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 53 (1990». 
65. Id. at 2047 (citing United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482 (1923». 
66. Id. at 2074 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
67. Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
68. Jenkins Ill, 115 S. Ct. at 2061. 
69. The majority opinion criticized the district court for attempting to advance the goal of 
"de segregative attractiveness" because of its view that such a goal "results in so many imponder-
ables and is so far removed from the task of eliminating the racial identifiability of the schools 
... that ... it is beyond the admittedly broad discretion of the District Court." ld. at 2055. 
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surrounding school districts had not themselves been guilty of any 
constitutional violation.70 The Court went on to "reject[] '[t]he sug-
gestion ... that schools which have a majority of Negro students are 
not 'desegregated,' whatever the racial makeup of the school district's 
population and however neutrally the district lines have been drawn 
and administered.'''71 The Supreme Court criticized the district court 
for creating a magnet district to serve the "interdistrict" goal of at-
tracting non-minority students from the surrounding state school dis-
tricts and redistributing them within the KCMSD.72 It thus concluded 
such a broad remedy was beyond the scope of the district court's re-
medial authority.73 The Court found that the district court's order, 
designed to create "desegregative attractiveness," and its "[i]nsistence 
upon academic goals unrelated to the effects of legal segregation un-
warrantably postpones the day when the KCMSD will be able to oper-
ate on its own."74 
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor commented that fed-
eralism concerns would limit the remedial power of the federal court 
in addressing school desegregationJ5 Justice O'Connor emphasized 
that the courts are constrained by "necessary restrictions on our juris-
diction and authority contained in Article III of the Constitution."76 
70. !d. at 2047. Justice Rehnquist has displayed a long-standing inclination to strike down 
segregation plans that attempt to remedy shifts in population and housing patterns. See, e.g., 
Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976) (holding that order requiring annual 
readjustment of attendance zones so that no school would have a majority-minority racial make-
up exceeded court's authority; and finding that a "quite normal pattern of human migration 
[that] resulted in some changes in the demographies of ... residential patterns ... [and] in the 
racial make up of some schools ... [was] not attributed to ... segregative actions."). 
71. Jenkins lll, 115 S. Ct. at 2048 (quoting Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 747 n.22). 
72. !d. at 2051. 
73. [d. Not all scholars have agreed that the right to attend desegregated schools is limited 
in remedial scope to only those remedies that take effect within the school district. See Norman 
Amaker, Milliken v. Bradley: The Meaning of the Constitution in School Desegregation Cases, 2 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 349, 352-59 (1975); see also id. at 359 (noting that the dissenters' argu-
ment in Milliken reasonably recognized that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, "school district 
boundaries may give way ... if that is required to prevent state denial of equal educational 
opportunity to black children"). 
74. Jenkins lll, 115 S. Cl. at 2056. 
75. [d. at 2061 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[F)ederal courts are specifically admonished to 
'take into account the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs.'" 
(quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281 (1977»). 
76. /d. At the heart of the controversy over the extent of the power of federal courts to 
control local school districts is the debate over the scope of the remedy and the consideration 
over local autonomy. As one writer has recognized, "Missouri v. Jenkins raises the fundamental 
questions about the extent of the power of the federal courts to remedy constitutional violations. 
On the other hand, a concern for federalism counsels against giving federal judges unlimited 
power over the affairs of state and local government." Martin A. Schwartz, The School Taxation 
Decision, N.Y. LJ., May 16, 1990, at col. 1. 
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She further reasoned that "[t]he unfortunate fact of racial imbalance 
and bias in our society, however pervasive or invidious, does not ad-
mit of judicial intervention absent a constitutional violation. ,,77 
Justice Thomas, in a separate concurring opinion, criticized the 
district court for what Thomas characterized as an "experiment with 
the education of ... black youth. "78 Justice Thomas, on one hand, 
indicates that harm has been "done to those black school children in-
jured by segregation,,,79 but later in his concurrence criticizes "the the-
ory that black students suffer an unspecified psychological harm from 
segregation that retards their mental and educational development."so 
Justice Thomas recommended that the Court "should demand that re-
medial decrees be more precisely designed to ben~fit only those who 
have been victims of segregation."81 He asserted that "the remedy for 
de jure segregation ordinarily should not include educational pro-
grams for students who were not in school (or were even alive) during 
the period of segregation."82 
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Souter criticized the majority's review 
of the district court's order granting equitable relief, in part because 
the Court "did not accept for review[,] ... need not reach ... , and ... 
specifically refused to consider" the issue of remedial orders of the 
district court when granting certiorari in the case.83 · He also criticized 
as "flatly contrary to established precedent"B4 the majority's assertion 
that the "rule against interdistrict remedies for intradistrict violations 
applies to this case, solely because the remedy here is meant to pro-
duce effects outside the district in which the violation occurred. "85 
77. Jenkins 1Il, 115 S. Ct. at 2061. 
78. TtL at 2062 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
79. TtL at 2061 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
80. Td. at 2062. Although Justice Thomas suggests that he is not convinced that segregation 
hanns black students in their educational development, some scholars have reached the conclu-
sion that its ill effects are significant. Derrick Bell writes: 
Despite their promises for the future, history offers important warnings regarding the 
prospects of single-race schools. All-black public schools before Brown were notorious 
for the scandalously inferior quality of theIr education. Today, separate remains une- . 
qual. Over thirty-five years after Brown, evidence shows that predominantly black 
schools have higher student-faculty ratios, less experienced and lower paid teachers, 
inferior facilities, and lower quality course offerings and extracurricular programs than 
white schools. Given the continuity in the economic and political powerlessness of 
blacks in this country, it is naive to suppose that things would be any different today. 
BELL, supra note 46, at 611 (footnotes omitted). 
81. Jenkins lII, 115 S. Ct. at 2073 (Thomas. J., concurring). 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 2073 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
84. Td. at 2083. 
85. Id. 
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Justice Souter suggested that the effect of the majority opinion 
"amounts to a redefinition of the terms of Milliken and consequently 
to a substantial expansion of its limitation on the permissible remedies 
for prior segregation. "86 
Justice Souter also accused the majority of implicitly overruling 
the effect of a prior unanimous Supreme Court opinion,87 Hills v. 
Gautreaux,88 where the Court had approved interdistrict relief in the 
absence of interdistrict violations. Souter, fearing that the majority's 
opinion would become "an arbitrary and mechanical shield for those 
found to have engaged in unconstitutional conduct,"89 reminded the 
majority that "there [is] no 'per se' rule that federal courts lack au-
thority to order parties found to have violated the Constitution to un-
dertake remedial efforts beyond the municipal boundaries of the city 
where the violation occurred. "90 -
In a separate dissent, Justice Ginsburg noted that "[g]iven the 
deep, inglorious history of segregation, in Missouri, to curtail desegre-
gation at this time and in this manner is an action at once too swift and 
too soon."91 Justice Ginsburg's dissent not only embraced Justice 
Souter's reasoning, but also emphasized that Missouri's history of seg-
regation warranted extreme caution before the state should be re-
leased from close federal oversight.92 
The Supreme Court's recent opinion in Jenkins represents the 
Court's continuing shift toward federalism and the consideration of 
states' rights in its jurisprudence.93 There can be few items of greater 
local interest than issues related to elementary and secondary 
schools-public education represents the largest expenditure for local 
86. Id. at 2088. 
87. Id. at 2089·90. 
88. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976). In Hills the district court found that the Chi-
cago housing authority and the federal Department of Housing had racially segregated the city's 
housing projects. The Court, Justice Stewart writing, held that a federal court could undertake 
efforts that went beyond the municipal boundaries of the city. Id. at 306. 
89. Jenkins III, 115 S. Ct. at 2090-91 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
90. Id. at 2089 (quoting Hills, 425 U.S. at 298) (footnotes omitted). 
91. Id. at 2091 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg noted that Missouri's pre-Civil 
War Black Codes "prohibited the creation or maintenance of schools for educating blacks: 'No 
person shall keep or teach any school for the instruction of negroes mulattoes, in reading or 
writing, in this State.'" Id. (citation omitted). She also noted that immediately after the Civil 
War, Missouri passed a series of laws requiring segregated schools. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 2061. 
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government.94 The intervention of a federal judge into the local com-
munity-to direct an extensive plan for spending local funds to deseg-
regate schools-caused the order to be viewed with great hostility. A 
plan so detailed as that ordered for KCMSD may not have been en-
tirely appropriate, at least in a prudential sense, to remedy the ves-
tiges of discrimination in that district. 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court painted with too broad a 
brush in wholly invalidating interdistrict remedies. Jenkins may have 
a profound detrimental effect on how local school districts handle de-
segregation in the future. The Supreme Court's opinion serves as a 
disincentive for district judges considering new or unproven desegre-
gation strategies that may, in any way, affect adjoining school districts. 
School districts will examine pending litigation involving its neighbors 
much more closely and will be less willing to accommodate those 
plans if they can intervene in the litigation and avoid cooperation. 
The awkward procedural mechanism employed in this case that 
permitted the original equitable order to be essentially "reopened"95 
will encourage those states already under court order to be less vigor-
ous in complying with those orders. Those jurisdictions will recognize 
that there is now a possibility that appellate courts or the Supreme 
Court may limit the jurisdiction of a district judge to order equitable 
relief in a subsequent appeal. Jenkins may also encourage resistance 
to federal court orders already in place if local lawyers advise school 
districts that a current plan arguably contains inappropriate "interdis-
trict' , remedies. 
The legacy of avoiding compliance with the federal courts is noth-
ing new in school desegregation.96 Much of that resistance was inten-
tional and required the firm intervention of the courts.97 Without the 
broad remedial power of the federal courts, very little would have 
been accomplished to compel some school districts to comply. 
The unavailability of interdistrict remedies reduces the already 
limited options of local governments to redress racial discrimination in 
education that may have occurred over several decades. In short, the 
94. In 1992, America spent nearly $419 billion on education, of which $235 billion went to 
public elementary and secondary schools. Kevin P. McJessy, Contract Law: The Proper Frame-
work For Litigating Educational Liability Claims, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1768, 1787 n.76 (1995). 
95. Jenkins lll, l1S S. Ct. at 2043-46. 
96. See, e.g., Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969). 
97. Court-ordered desegregation in many states was met with blatant resistance, judicial 
hostility, and legislative evasion. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation: 
Progress and Prospects, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 193,203-12 (1964). 
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Supreme Court in Jenkins has planted the seeds of apathy in the area 
of public school desegregation. This may cause the erosion of mean-
ingful school desegregation orders because the court has, "with all de-
liberate speed,"98 relaxed its potential coercive grip on local school 
officials who may already be reluctant to remedy past discrimina-
tion.99 Respect for desegregation orders may unravel, and diligent ef-
forts to achieve any racial balance will cease because there will be no 
fear of court intervention. While it is not always necessary to use the 
full force of judicial equitable power to bring about compliance with a 
court's order, the presence of broad power to grant relief encourages 
agreements and voluntary compliance at the local leve1.100 
Also troubling is the tone of the Jenkins opinion, which suggests a 
dominant role for federalism in desegregation orders in general. It 
was the resistance to the federal constitution by state officials, under 
the banner of federalism, that led to the need for coercive interven-
tion to enforce school desegregation in the first instance.101 A better 
approach for the Supreme Court to have taken would have been more 
carefully to review the factual basis upon which the district judge in 
Jenkins relied, rather than to eliminate the traditionally broad range 
of potential equitable relief. In this way, the Supreme Court could 
have avoided the impression that Jenkins is simply its way of aban-
doning the unfinished business of public school desegregation. Yet 
the Court's leanings toward abandonment of school desegregation 
98. Cf Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
99. See Jenkins Ill, 115 S. Ct. at 2091 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The power to order aggres-
sive, tax-related remedies against local governments may assist in encouraging their voluntary 
cooperation with constitutional mandates. One insightful commentator reasons that: 
[Ljegitimating judicial power to enforce judgments by ordering tax levies is not ... to 
encourage courts to exercise this power. Indeed, the circumstances in which such or-
ders are warranted are quite limited. The purpose of making judicial power to order 
tax levies a "credible threat" is to encourage state and local governments to devise 
political solutions .... 
D. Bruce La Pierre, Enforcement of Judgments Against States and Local Governments: Judicial 
Control Over the Power to Tax, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 299,307 (1993). La Pierre provides a 
comprehensive justification for federal courts' ordering state officials to pay for purpose of pro-
viding a remedy for constitutional violations. 
100. Often some school districts refuse to meet their constitutional duty to desegregate until 
the district court orders them to do so. It is for that reason that the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that the courts' equitable powers to remedy past discrimination are inherently broad and 
flexible. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971). 
101. One need only reflect on the resistance of state officials in Little Rock, Arkansas, after 
the original Brown decision to be alert to the potential risks of too much federalism in the 
implementation of unpopular constitutional rights. Because of political pressure and opposition 
to the Supreme Court mandate in Brown, Governor Orval Faubus resisted integration, and fed-
eral troops were required to enforce desegregation of Central High School in Little Rock. See 
DAVIS & CLARK, supra note 27, at 185-97. 
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was foreshadowed in Freeman v. Pitts,102 decided three terms ago by 
the Court. 
In Freeman, the Court ruled that a school system could be re-
lieved of some of its obligations under a district court order if it was 
found to be in compliance in some areas but not others.103 In that 
case, DeKalb County, Georgia, was under the supervision of the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia 
since it had been ordered to dismantle its dual school system in 
1969.104 After the mandate in Brown, the county took no steps to 
desegregate until the 1966-1967 school year when it adopted a free-
dom-of-choice transfer plan. IDS Under that plan, several black stu-
dents attended formerly all-white schools, but there was virtually no 
effect on the formerly de jure black schools.lo6 In 1968, several black 
school children and their parents brought suit, and a desegregation 
plan began under a consent decree.107 By 1986, however, dramatic 
demographic changes to the county population had occurred. In 1969, 
56% of the county's students were black, but by 1986 that figure had 
risen to 47%.108 During the same period the white population shifted 
to counties surrounding DeKalb.lo9 The Court held that the county 
had no obligation to remedy racial imbalance caused by demographic 
102. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992). 
103. [d. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, held that the district court 
has the authority to relinquish control over some aspects of its previously ordered desegregation 
plan, while retaining its control over others. The court explained, 
[UJpon a finding that a school system subject to a court-supervised desegregation plan 
IS In compliance in some but not all areas. the court in appropriate cases may return 
control of the school systems in those areas where compliance has been achieved .... 
In particular, the district court may determine that it will not order further remedies in 
the area of student assignments where racial imbalance is not traceable, in a proximate 
way, to constitutional violations. 
Among the factors which must inform the sound discretion of the court in ordering 
partial withdrawal are the following: whether there has been full and satisfactory com-
pliance with the decree in those aspects of the system where supervision is to be with-
drawn; whether retention of judicial control is necessary or practicable to achieve 
com{lliance with the decree in other facets of the school system; and whether the school 
distnct has demonstrated, to the public and to the parents and students of the once 
disfavored race, its good faith commitment to the whole of the court's decree and 10 
those provisions of the law and the constitution that were the predicate for the judicial 
intervention in the first instance. 
[d. at 491. 
104. [d. at 471. 
105. [d. at 472. 
106. [d. 
107. [d. Under the consent decree, all formerly de jure black schools were closed and the 
students were assigned to the remaining schools in the neighborhood. ld. 
108. [d. at 475. 
109. [d. 
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factors. 11o That decision, combined with Jenkins and other rumina-
tions from the Court, such as Justice Thomas's suggestion that integra-
tion itself is not a valued goal in American education,l11 clearly signal 
a retreat from the Supreme Court's strong commitment to participa-
tion of the federal courts in desegregation. It is as if the difficulty of 
the problem has caused the Supreme Court to grow bored with the 
job of supervising its solutions. The problem did not occur overnight, 
however, and cannot be solved overnight. 
The vestige of unequal educational opportunity in this country is 
one of the most perplexing problems our nation has ever confronted, 
and, indeed, continues to confront. Jenkins, however, signals a new 
tolerance for local officials who may simply want to stop trying to 
achieve any racial balance whatsoever, and the current state of the law 
will paralyze our ability to solve the problem. Freeman teaches us that 
we cannot chase the children through the state to contain white stu-
dents in a school district,112 and Jenkins teaches that we cannot, gener-
ally, create a school district to make the children chase the school.113 
Jenkins further instructs that there are limits on how federal courts 
110. ld. at 483. Lawyers from the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. as-
serted, "Throughout the country as many as 400 school districts still are wrangling with legal 
issues stemming from desegregation lawsuits first filed in the mid-'50s to late '60s .... " Linda 
Gibson, Exhibit A: Case Closing, 37 Years of School Case is Enough But Original Plaintiffs and 
Allies Fear Backsliding in Long-Running Florida Dispute, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 8, 1996, at AIO. 
111. Jenkins Ill, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2064 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas felt 
compelled, in a footnote, to criticize research that might suggest that integration has educational 
value. He wrote, "[Tjhere is simply no conclusive evidence that desegregation either has 
sparked a permanent jump in the achievement scores of black children, or has remedied any 
psychological feelings of inferiority black school children might have." ld. It seems clear that 
Justice Thomas has personally rejected one of the premises of the Brown decision. 
112. In relieving a state from the responsibility to desegregate where residential 
demographics has caused resegregation, the Court said: 
In one sense of the term, vestiges of past segregation by state decree do remain in our 
society and in our schools. Past wrongs to the black race, wrongs committed by the 
State and in its name, are a stubborn fact of history .. And stubborn facts of history 
linger and persist. But though we cannot escape our history. neither must we overstate 
its consequences in fixing legal responsibilities. The vestiges of segregation that are the 
concern of the law in a school case may be subtle and intangible but nonetheless they 
must be so real that they have a causal link to the de jure violation being remedied. It is 
simply not always the case that demo~raphic forces causing population change bear any 
reaf and substantial relation to a de Jure violation. And the law need not proceed on 
that premise. 
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467. 496 (1992). By requiring a causal connection between the chang-
ing demographics of a community and the racial discrimination that led to segregated schools. 
the Court has made the use of interdistrict remedies by a district court nearly impossible. 
113. Jenkins III. 115 S. Ct. at 2061. The majority opinion went out of its way in dicta to warn 
the lower court not to engage in any remedies that relied on "desegregative attractiveness": 
The Court today discusses desegregative attractiveness only insofar as it supports the 
salary increase order under review and properly refrains from addressing the propriety 
of all the remedies that the District Court has ordered, revised, and extended m tlte 18-
year history of this case. These remedies may also be improper to the extent that they 
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may control expenditures for the primary "raw materials" to provide 
equal education: teacher salaries and funds for creative program-
ming.114 With the Supreme Court's restrictive approach to the avail-
able remedies to halt the increase of "one race" schools, it is likely 
that many desegregation plans will simply rot on the judicial vine. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Having invested so much into integration as a tool for achieving 
"one" America, we should demand clear proof that desegregation 
cannot work before we abandon it as our primary tool of ensuring 
equal education.ll5 Although there have been many problems with 
efforts to integrate, we have enjoyed many successes that would never 
have occurred without courageous and often controversial efforts to 
compel people of different racial backgrounds to learn togetherY6 
serve the same goals of desegregative attractiveness and suburban comparability that 
we hold today to be impermissible .... 
Id. at 2061. Implicit in the Court's comments is a rejection of the goal of achieving racial balance 
through a district court order that takes into account rapidly shifting demographics. When com-
bined with Freeman v. Pitts. the two cases make clear that a district judge must stay within 
district boundaries in ordering relief. If the district itself has become predominantly "one race" 
through demographic shifts, the lower courts are virtually forbidden to remedy that situation in 
its desegregation plan. 
114. See supra note 107. The rationale for ordering teacher salary increases in Jenkins III 
was not simply the whim of the district court, rather, the factual record supported the need for 
the increases. The record revealed that without salary increases. salaries would "revert to a level 
which will result in intolerable consequences for the desegregation plan. Such a rollback would 
place the KCMSD teacher salary schedule thousands of dollars behind any comparable school 
district and would devastate the District's ability to attract and retain teachers." Jenkins v. Mis-
souri. No. 77-0420-CV-W-4. 1992 WL 551568. at *2 (W.D. Mo. June 25. 1992). 
115. It may be that a racially and economically diverse classroom has value as an educational 
tool. Some research has demonstrated that black children in a desegregated school are more 
likely to graduate from high school and college and to escape much of the social pathology 
associated with poverty. See William L. Taylor. Brown, [solation and Equal Protection, and the 
Isolation o/the Poor, 95 YALE L.J. 1700.1710-11 & n.40 (1986). This conclusion is in conflict 
with the views expressed by Justice Thomas. See supra note 111. Professor Laurence Tribe has 
cautioned that such a conclusion as has been reached by Taylor's research may be a double-
edged sword for those who seek to advance racial equality. He comments: 
Whatever its empirical merits. this line of reasoning contains a distasteful echo of the 
argument pressed by the plaintiff in Plessy, that he had a right to sit amongst whites ... 
because the 'reputation of belonging to the dominant race, in this instance the white 
race,' was a property right that could not be deprived. 
LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1476 (2d ed. 1988). Professor Tribe fur-
ther notes that, in his view, "neither that rationale nor its modem incarnations will do." Id. 
116. It has been observed that a mixed race classroom may enhance the education for minor-
ity students if most of those students are from lower socio-economic backgrounds. Professor 
Marilyn Yarbrough writes: 
Even if we were to determine that racial mixing is not itself an important goal, there is 
growin,8 evidence that socio-economic class rather than race causes the difference in 
educational achievement. If class does matter and students from lower socio-economic 
backgrounds suffer more educational disadvantage than their middle class and upper 
class peers, to the extent that so many more minority students than non-minority stu-
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Our society is becoming increasingly multi-cultural.1l7 We will soon 
no longer be able to avoid that reality by running further from our 
urban centers, leaving them as a place to work but where the educa-
tional systems rot from inattention and lack of funds. ll8 If it is crime 
in schools that makes many fear integration, let us together attack 
crime.1l9 If it is the schools' inability to attract and retain good teach-
ers, then let us make our teaching staff a priority. If it is the economic 
and social challenges presented by urban decay, drug abuse, teenage 
pregnancy, and a decaying industrial base, let us address those matters 
dents are poor, minority students suffer disproportionately. Therefore. mixing socio-
economic classes invariably means mixing races, a potential catalyst for better educa-
tion for poor students and, therefore, better education for minority students. 
Marilyn V. Yarbrough, Still Separate and Still Unequal. 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 685, 693 (1995). 
117. It has been noted that "[sjince the 1960s ... three important demographic trends have 
changed the face of America and its race relations: first, the increasing percentage of persons of 
color; second, the increasing percentage of persons of color who are not black; and third, the 
increasing number of persons who consider themselves multiracial." Deborah Ramirez, Mul-
ticultural Empowerment: It's Nol Just Black and While Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957,959 
(1995) (collecting various demographic statistics and studies). 
Another commentator has observed that "the demographics of the United States are under-
going a sea change. Early in the next millennium, the United States will cease being a predomi-
nantly caucasian nation with a EUropean heritage." Robert Justin Lipkin, Liberalism and the 
Possibility of Multicultural Constitutionalism: The Distinction Between Deliberative and Dedi-
cated Cultures, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1263, 1266 (1995). 
118. Jenkins III, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2075 (1995). Clearly, all problems will not be solved by 
throwing money at them; however, lack of financial resources remains a problem for providing 
equal education. As one observer has noted, although we may not always get what we pay for, 
"[wJhat seems equally clear ... is that we surely cannot get that which we adamantly will not pay 
for. . . . Children have become the disputed but uncared-for objects of contentious politics over 
federalism .... " Jane Maslow Cohen, Competitive and Cooperative Dependencies: The Case for 
Children, 81 VA. L. REV. 2217, 2235 (1995). 
119. Professor Robert R. Wright of the University of Arkansas School of Law suggests that a 
by-product of the desegregation plan in Little Rock, Arkansas, which has required the closing of 
schools in black neighborhoods that cannot be integrated, "has been ... the rise in crime and the 
organization of gangs in cities throughout the U.S." Robert R. Wright, On Its Anniversary: A 
Look Back at Brown v. Board of Education, 28 ARK. L. 51 (1994). He reasons that "[wjhen 
schools are closed in black neighborhoods. one of the major anchors for the black community 
has been eliminated." Jd. Although it is difficult to quarrel with the notion that a school can 
anchor a community, a school alone cannot provide the healthy balance required for a thriving 
community. Economic stability, decent housing, and a sense of hopefulness also contribute. In-
deed, efforts to desegregate should not be unfairly blamed for problems in a community that 
were caused by other factors. including the flight of many middle class citizens from the urban 
centers, leaving fewer businesses and a reduced tax base and, in general, a less desirable commu-
nity for those who simply cannot afford to leave. "Black neighborhoods seem impoverished 
today not so much because they are segregated, as because most blacks with jobs have moved 
out." LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE NEW POUTICS OF POVERTY 57 (1992) (footnote omitted). 
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directly.12o But we should not abandon integration simply because 
other problems have frustrated US.121 
'When I was eight years old, Martin Luther King 1r.122 and Robert 
F. Kennedy123 were assassinated within two months of each other. My 
grandmother, a junior high school English teacher, took my brother 
and- me to see the train that was carrying Robert Kennedy's body. I 
remember asking her that day about "integration," because I had 
heard the word on television and it seemed to be important. She told 
me that "integration is making sure that kids of all races and back-
grounds are in class together." She told me integration was good, not 
because one group of people was smarter than another or because 
some lifestyles and cultures were better than others, but rather, she 
said, "So long as we are all in the same room, teachers cannot share 
information with some students without sharing it with all." She ad-
ded that "because people are different does not mean that they cannot 
learn from each other." 
120. The complex problems faced by the urban and rural poor still are at the heart of our 
deteriorating public education system. It has also become apparent to some "that poverty is 
closely intertwined with issues of discrimination on the basis of race and other minority status, 
and gender." Peter B. Edelman, Toward a Comprehensive Anti-Poverty Strategy: Getting Beyond 
the Silver Bullet, 81 GEO. L.J. 1697, 1698 (1993) (footnotes omitted); see generally id. passim 
(reviewing current poverty statistics and discussing the continuing plight of the poor, including 
circumstances of unemployment, violence, drug abuse, crime, and teen pregnancy). 
121. Many social ills contribute to the challenge of providing adequate education_ The Black 
community suffers in a way objectively more severe than the white community. Professor Ken-
neth Tolbert has observed that: 
Virtually every social indicator for measuring the well being of individuals or groups in 
society IS negative or shows gross gaps between Blacks and Whites. Such gaps may be 
found in wealth income and employment; health ... ; housing; criminal law enforcement 
or involvement; electoral and political representation; and last, but not least, indeed, 
the most important indicator, education. 
Kenneth S. Tolbert, Sr., The Case For Black Higher Education & Affirmative Action, N.B.A.J., 
Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 13 (footnotes omitted). 
122. Dr. King was assassinated on April 4, 1968 in Memphis, Tennessee. During 1963, he 
had occasion to comment on school desegregation and the Brown decision: 
The Negro had been deeply disappointed over the slow pace of school desegregation. 
He knew that in 1954 the highest court in the land had handed down a decree calling 
for desegregation of schools "with all deliberate speed." He knew that this edict from 
the Supreme Court had been headed with all deliberate delay. At the beginning of 
1963, nine years after this historic decision, approximately 9 percent of southern Negro 
students were attending negro schools. If this pace were maintained, it would be the 
year 2054 before integration in southern schools would be a reality. 
A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 520 (James 
M. Washington ed., 1986). 
123. Robert Kennedy, former Senator from New York and then Attorney General of the 
United States, was assassinated on June 5, 1968. He was a key proponent of America's desegre-
gation effort before his death. As Attorney General, he pledged to press forward to desegregate 
the public schools. TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KiNG YEARS 
1954-63, at 414 (1988). 
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At the time I thought her statements simply meant that she be-
lieved integration was a good thing. It was not until years later that 
the true significance of her statements became apparent to me: equal-
ity in education does not mean any group of people is inferior or supe-
rior to any other group of people.124 And it is critical that all students 
have an opportunity to dine at the same table. Sometimes equal edu-
cation requires that we learn with and about each other even if we do 
not like the extra effort required to make that possible. A failure to 
require our children to test their views and perspectives with each 
other will guarantee a future where we will have unequal substance in 
education. Our children will lack the skills to avoid conflict with those 
who are different. In a society growing in diversity,125 we can ill afford 
to deny our children an educational experience that will arm them 
with the tools to seek common ground.126 
My fear is that the political controversy that arises from desegre-
gation and the challenges presented by rapidly changing 
demographics will chill local school officials and politicians from en-
gaging in creative ways to ensure an integrated education in elemen-
tary and secondary schools. Although the challenges to resolve these 
problems are difficult, we should not be deterred by the same short-
sighted, but sometimes persuasive, skepticism that prevented us for so 
long from freeing all Americans from the shackles of "separate but 
equal" and the embarrassing legacy of Jim Crow.127 Today Jim Crow 
124. See supra note 16. 
125. According to Census Bureau statistics, the United States population is currently "73.6 
percent white, 12 percent black, 10.2 percent Latino, 3.3 percent Asian and 0.7 percent Ameri-
can Indian .... [I)n 2050, the United States will be 52.8 percent white, 24.5 percent Latino, 13.6 
percent black, 8.2 percent Asian and 0.9 percent American Indian." Latino, Asians Are Expected 
to Fuel U.S. Population Growth; Census Bureau Predicts Rise in Retirees As Well, BALTIMORE 
SUN, Mar. 14, 1996, at 3A. 
126. The importance of strong public education cannot be overstated in a democratic society. 
"It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is the principannstrument in awakening 
the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to 
adjust normally to his environment." Brown I, 347 U.S. 483,492-93 (1954). Near the tum of the 
century, the New Hampshire Supreme Court observed that public education is a "means of pro-
tecting the state from the consequences of ignorant and incompetent citizenship." Fogg v. Board 
of Educ .. 82 A. 173, 174-75 (N.H. 1912). 
127. "The public symbols and constant reminders of [the Negro's) inferior position were the 
segregation statutes, or 'Jim Crow'laws. They constituted the most elaborate and formal expres-
sion of sovereign white opinion upon the subject." C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CA· 
REER OF JIM CROW 7 (3d ed. 1974) (footnote omitted). 
According to one account, 
Jim Crow was first heard by the American public in 1832 when Thomas 'Daddy' Rice, 
one of the first whites to perform comic representations of blacks, danced across the 
stage of New York's Bowery Theater and sang the lyrics of the song that would become 
America's first international hit: 
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may be legally dead, but the gap in education and wealth persists 
along racial lines. This gap should serve as a constant reminder of 
legal segregation's stubborn stain. Many simply blame efforts to 
achieve school desegregation for these problems. But among those 
critics are, no doubt, many who never gave integration even a fighting 
chance to work. 
We can no longer avoid the crossroads that we now approach. 
Education is the gateway to our collective future, and we must all pass 
through. Although it may be difficult to achieve desegregation in the 
face of rapidly changing demographics, it should be remembered that 
many of these demographic forces were the result of the same past 
discrimination that caused resistance to integration during the days of 
"separate but equal." If the promise of integrated public education 
becomes a casualty of our fear of each other and our inability to agree 
on what we intend to do about it, we will virtually guarantee a society 
that will be unable to deal effectively with our future-a future that 
promises even more rapid cultural and social change than we have 
thus far experienced.128 
Weel a·bout and turn a·bout 
And do just so. 
Every time I weel a·bout 
I jump Jim Crow. 
JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE 12 (1988). 
By the early 1990s, Jim Crow described a far reaching, institutional segregation 
that affected every aspect of American life. Schools, restaurants, trains and all forms of 
transportation, theaters, drinking fountains-virtually all public and many private facil-
ities practiced total separation of the races .... [1]n South Carolina black and white 
cotton-mill workers were prohibited from looking out the same window. 
[d. at 12-13. 
128. James Baldwin, commenting on integration in the early 1960s, wrote, "lIlf the word 
integration means anything, this is what it means: that we, with love, shall force our brothers to 
see themselves as they are, to cease fleeing from reality and begin to change it ... and we can 
make America what America must become." JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME 9-10 (First 
Vintage 1993) (1963). 
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